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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
BRITANIE BELL, 
Plaintiff/Respondent, 
vs. 
Supreme Court Case No. 41639 
Ada County No.: CV-DR-2011-12381 
APPELLANT'S OPENING BRIEF 
MICHAEL EAGY, 
Defendant/ Appellant. 
APPELLANT'S OPENING BRIEF 
Appeal From The District Court Of The Fourth Judicial District Of the State Ofldaho, In 
And For The County Of Ada, Siting As Appellate Court for the Magistrate Division Of The 
Fourth Judicial District 
The Honorable Michael McLaughlin, Senior District Judge, Presiding (the Honorable Judge 
David E. Day Presiding In the Magistrate Court 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This case involves contempt and summary judgment. The relevant portion of this case 
began when the Respondent herein, Britanie Bell, filed a Motion for Nonsummary Finding of 
Contempt and Entry of Judgment. Her motion was supported by the Affidavit ofBritanie Bell in 
Support of Motion for Nonsummary Finding of Contempt and Entry of Judgment. 
The parties have never been married but have four children together. The Court entered a 
Stipulated Decree Establishing Custody, Visitation and Child Support ("Stipulated Decree") on 
April 10, 2012. The Stipulated Decree establishes a custody schedule between the parties and 
orders Mr. Eagy to pay support for the minor children. The Stipulated Decree also the divides 
work-related daycare costs and health care costs pro rata between the parties. As to health care 
and daycare costs, the Stipulated Decree also establishes a procedure for processing those costs 
between the parties. In her contempt action, Ms. Bell asserted Mr. Eagy had violated the decree 
by failing to pay health care costs and work-related daycare costs. Mr. Eagy responds that Ms. 
Bell did not do those acts necessary to establish an obligation on his part. That is, she did not 
satisfy the conditions precedent that are necessary to create an obligation. 
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As to health care costs, the Stipulated Decree provides: 
14. PROCESSING OF HEALTHCARE (SIC) COSTS: If either party 
incurs any health care expenses for the benefit of the minor children, then such 
party shall notify the other as soon as possible and shall provide the other with a 
copy of any health care bill so incurred, immediately upon the receipt of such bill. 
The bill shall then ben submitted without delay for processing under any health or 
other insurance plan that may be applicable, by the party providing such insurance 
coverage. The party submitting the bills for payment by insurance shall then be 
required to provide the other party with a copy of any correspondence from the 
insurer immediately and without delay, setting forth the action taken by the 
insurer in processing the claim. Each party shall then have fifteen (15) days in 
which to either pay in full directly to the health care provider any unpaid expenses 
to the extent insurance does not cover such charges, or to make satisfactory 
arrangements with the health care provider for pay of the percentage allocated to 
such party ... 
For the payment of work-related daycare costs, the decree provides: 
15. CHILDCARE: Any work-related childcare expenses incurred for 
the benefit of the minor children of the party shall be divided between the parties 
in proportion to the income .... Each party shall make direct payment to the 
childcare provider and hold the other party harmless from liability for such 
childcare charges in excess of the other party's share of such expenses. If either 
party fails to comply with this provision, and the other party suffers financial loss 
or other arrangements for childcare have to be made as a result, then supplemental 
contempt proceedings may be initiated and all court costs and attorney fees 
thereby incurred shall be awarded to the prevailing party in such enforcement 
proceedings. 
(Stipulated Decree). 
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In her motion, Ms. Bell asserted nine counts of contempt. Eight counts alleges Mr. Eagy 
failed to pay work-related child care costs. (Motion for Nonsummary Finding of Contempt and 
Entry of Judgment, Counts I-VIII). One count alleged he had failed to pay health care costs 
(Count IX). In her motion Ms. Bell asked for both civil and criminal sanctions. She also prayed 
for the entry of a judgment for the amounts she claimed were by Mr. Eagy. 
In response, Mr. Eagy filed a Motion for Summary Judgment. In his supporting affidavit, 
Mr. Eagy made several factual assertions and clarified certain factual assertions that were 
ambiguous in the motion and affidavit filed by Ms. Bell. 
Ms. Bell next filed two additional affidavits that are relevant to his appeal: The Affidavit 
ofBritanie Bell, dated April 16, 2013 and the Affidavit of Jenny Shepherd also dated April 16, 
2013. Those affidavits did not refute the specific, germane factual assertions by Mr. Eagy. 
Instead, Ms. Bell's affidavits and the affidavit of Jenny Shepherd made conclusory claims and 
ignored those facts established by Mr. Eagy which established his defense. 
At the hearing on summary judgment, the following factual assertions in Mr. Eagy's 
affidavit were umefuted. The original paragraph numbers are retained. 
2. Prior to [emphasis added] the filing of the Plaintiffs Motion and Affidavit for 
Contempt, I was never presented any bill or receipt for child care expenses. I 
have never been asked to pay any child care provider directly. 
3. Although the Plaintiff has made demands for payment that she claims is for child 
care, I have not seen any invoice or receipt. 
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4. In addition, I understand that the stipulated decree awards us joint legal custody. 
The Plaintiff has never involved me in any discussion regarding the daycare to be 
used for our children. I believe, although I am not entirely certain, that the person 
who occasionally provides care for our minor children is a friend of the Plaintiff. 
5. Prior to the Plaintiffs filing of the Motion and Affidavit for Contempt, I have also 
never been asked to pay a healthcare provider directly. Again, the Plaintiff has 
made demands to me that are supported by a spreadsheet she emails to me. In 
email correspondence with the Plaintiff I have asked that she use the process 
identified in our stipulated decree for the payment of both daycare costs and 
healthcare costs 
Although Ms. Bell, in her second affidavit, states that she has provided Mr. Eagy 
documentation of the child care costs. She fails to mention the date that she provided 
documentation. Of course, as will be discussed herein, if there are assertions by Ms. Bell in her 
second affidavit that, if unrefuted would save the contempt from summary judgment or dismissal 
for failing to state a cause of action, those statements would have had to have been contained in 
the initiating affidavit. 
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In granting summary judgment, Judge Day found that the initial Affidavit ofBritanie Bell 
in Support of Contempt and the affidavits filed in response to Mr. Eagy's Motion for Summary 
Judgment failed to articulate or assert facts that would support a prima facie case for contempt. 
Judge Day also held that the Plaintiff was not entitled to a judgment for money damages. It has 
never been entirely clear from the Plaintiffs pleadings what she believes to be the basis for a 
! 
money judgment. In her initial Motion for Nonsummary Finding of Contempt and Entry of 
Judgment, the Plaintiff appears to be asking that the Court enter a judgment as a remedy for the 
contempt. In a subsequent briefing, it would appear that the Plaintiff believes she is entitled to 
judgment even if she has failed to establish a contempt. In either event, Judge Day found that the 
Plaintiff had not established a basis for entry of a judgment against Mr. Eagy. 
At the hearing on summary judgment, Ms. Bell's counsel conceded that the affidavits 
filed by Ms. Bell did not state that Ms. Bell had complied with the procedure described above as 
they related to health care costs. When asked by Judge Day to "pick any expense" and step 
through how the expense was processed under the decree, counsel conceded that "I did not 
articulate it in that speci specificity." (Motion Hearing Transcript, April 30, 2013, page 21-22.) 
Judge Day found that Ms. Bell's initiating affidavit did not allege facts which would 
constitute a contempt. (Motion Hearing Transcript, April 30, 2013, page 22.). Judge Day found 
that the claimed health care contempt was deficient in that it did not allege the specific process in 
the decree had been followed, and the Ms. Bell essentially conceded that point in the hearing 
before Judge Day. 
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Judge Day also found that the contempts alleging a violation for nonpayment of childcare 
costs failed to allege facts that would be necessary for contempt. Specifically, the affidavit in 
support of contempt failed to allege that Mr. Eagy had failed to pay the provider and that the 
decree did not allow one party to incur the expense and demand reimbursement. 
Finally Judge Day held that a demand for a money judgment was not an available remedy 
in a contempt proceeding. 
On appeal to District Court, Judge Michael McLaughlin, Senior District Judge, 
interpreted the provision of the decree dividing health care costs in the same manner as Judge 
Day and, therefore, affirmed that portion of the Judge Day's decision. 
On the issue of daycare costs, however, Judge McLaughlin reversed. Judge McLaughlin 
found that the Stipulated Decree was unambiguous. Judge McLaughlin then sited the Affidavit 
of Jenny Shepherd and the Affidavit of Britanie Bell filed after Mr. Eagy filed his Motion for 
Summary Judgment as grounds for a defense to the summary judgment. Judge McLaughlin did 
not address the fact that the initiating affidavit on contempt did not contain all the facts assertions 
that would be necessary to establish contempt. 
ARGUMENT 
I. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
a. Review of the District Court In Its Appellate Capacity Is An Independent Review 
When the Court reviews a decision of the district court in its appellate capacity, the court 
reviews the magistrate's decision independently of the district court's decision. The Court of 
Appeals stated in Grecian v. Grecian, 140 Idaho 601 (2004): 
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In reviewing a decision of the district court rendered in its appellate capacity, we review 
the record of the magistrate court independently of, but with due regard for, the district 
court's decision. Worzala v. Worzala, 128 Idaho 408,411, 913 P.2d 1178, 1181 (1996); 
1'v1cAffee v. McA(fee, 132 Idaho 28L 284, 971 P.2d 734, 737 (Ct.App.1999). 
Id at 602. 
b. The Magistrate's Interpretation Of A Decree Is To Be Given Deference. 
The issue before Judge Day required the interpretation of the stipulated decree. "A 
magistrate's interpretation of a divorce decree will be upheld on review if it is supported by 
substantial and competent evidence." Grecian v. Grecian, 140 Idaho 601 (App. 2004) citing 
Ireland v. Ireland, 123 Idaho 955, 958. 855 P .2d 40. 43 (1993). 
Whether or not an affidavit initiating contempt is adequate to vest the court with 
jurisdiction is a question of law. In a case that is procedurally similar to this case, the Court of 
Appeal stated: 
On review of a decision of the district court, rendered in its appellate capacity, we 
examine the record of the trial court independently of, but with due regard for, the district 
court's intermediate appellate decision. Hentges v. Hentges, 115 Idaho 192, 194. 765 P.2d 
1094. 1096 (Ct.App.1988). 
Muthersbaugh v Neumann, 133 Idaho 677 (1999) at 679. 
The same court addressed the requirements for an initiating affidavit on contempt. 
Idaho Code Section 7-603 provides that in the case of indirect contempt "an 
affidavit shall be presented to the court or judge of the facts constituting the contempt." 
The affidavit on which an indirect contempt proceeding is based constitutes the 
complaint, and its function is to apprise the alleged contemnor of the particular facts of 
which he or she is accused so that he or she may meet such accusations at the hearing. 
Jones, 91 Idaho at 581,428 P.2d at 500. In a case of indirect contempt, when an affidavit 
of the facts constituting the contempt is required by statute, the court presiding over the 
contempt hearing acquires no jurisdiction to proceed until a sufficient affidavit has been 
presented. Bandelin v. Quinlan, 94 Idaho 858, 860, 499 P.2d 557. 559 (1972). Since 
contempt proceedings are quasi-criminal in nature, no intendments or presumptions may 
be indulged to aid the sufficiency of the affidavit. Id 
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Id at 679. 
IL 
THE lJNDISPUTED FACTS ENTITLE MR. EAGY TO SUMMARY ruDGEMENT 
a. The Affidavit Initiating Contempt Does Not Allege Facts Which Would 
Constitute Contempt. 
As stated above, for the trial court to have jurisdiction in a contempt action, the initiating 
affidavit-the charging document-must allege those facts which if prove true constitute a 
contempt. This case began prior to adoption of the local Family Law Rules of Procedure, so 
Rule 75 of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. The relevant portion of the rule provides: 
(2) Contempt Not Initiated by a Judge-Motion and Affidavit. All contempt 
proceedings, except those initiated by a judge as provided above, must be commenced by 
a motion and affidavit. Contempt proceedings shall not be initiated by an order to show 
cause. 
(3) Factual Allegations. The written charge of contempt or affidavit must allege 
the specific facts constituting the alleged contempt. Each instance of alleged contempt, if 
there is more than one, must be set forth separately. If the alleged contempt is the 
violation of a court order, the wTitten charge or affidavit must allege that either the 
respondent or the respondent's attorney was served with a copy of the order or had actual 
knowledge of it. The written charge or affidavit need not allege facts showing that the 
respondent's failure to comply with the court order was willful. 
In this case, the original affidavit Ms. Bell failed to allege facts which would constitute a 
contempt. 
Much of the following argument was advanced in the Memorandum in Support of 
Motion For Summary Judgment. 
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1. Daycare Costs. Plaintiff alleges that certain daycare costs have been incurred. 
She then states: "Defendant has been informed of the charges for daycare . . . by emails sent to 
the Defendant informing him of the chargesjand his portion thereof." The communication as 
alleged by the Plaintiff is only between the Plaintiff and Defendant. In the communication, 
Plaintiff never alleges that she provided an invoice, billing statement, or any other statement 
from a daycare provider to the Defendant. She does not allege that any daycare provider 
communicated the cost of daycare to the Defendant. 
The decree in this case is somewhat unusual. The decree which the parties negotiated 
with the assistance of counsel, states that "Each party shall make direct payment to the childcare 
provider and hold the other party harmless from liability for such childcare charges in excess of 
the other party's share of such expenses." 
The Plaintiff does not allege that Defendant has failed to pay a childcare provider 
directly. Nor does she allege any collection actions against her and, consequently, the need for 
the Defendant to hold her harmless. In the emails she attaches to her affidavit, she is clearly 
demanding to be reimbursed. She has apparently ignored the terms of the Stipulated Decree 
wherein she is required to have the Defendant pay the childcare directly. She does not even 
provide receipts. She provides only a spreadsheet of her creation and a demand for payment. 
The provisions of the Stipulated Decree that govern payment of daycare costs is crafted 
in such manner as to require each party have a contractual relationship with the daycare provider. 
It, therefore, insures each party is involved in the selection of the daycare provider. Ms. Bell 
ignored that provision of the decree, selected and paid the daycare provider, and then sought 
reimbursement. This is the sort of action the decree was intended to avoid. 
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As Mr. Eagy said in his response affidavit, Ms. Shepherd is a friend of Ms. Bell's. He 
was never allowed to be involved in the selection of the daycare provider. (Aff of Defendant in 
Support of Motion For Summary Judgment at page 2.) Not only is Mr. Eagy joint legal 
custodian of the children, the decree requires he have a contractual relationship with the daycare 
provider. If he then breaches that contract and Ms. Bell is harmed financially, Ms. Bell can bring 
a contempt against Mr. Eagy. 
2. Medical Expenses. Plaintiff again ignored the terms of the decree she claims the 
Defendant has violated. In that portion of the Stipulated Decree governing division of health 
care expenses, the decree delineates a process for handling medical expenses. The decree 
requires that a party who incurs a medical expense, first submit the bill for the expense to health 
insurance carrier. That party then "shall be required to provide the other party a copy of any 
correspondence for the insurer immediately without delay, setting forth the action taken by the 
insurer in processing the claim." 
Only after a claim has been processed and correspondence from the insurer provided does 
the requirement for payment arise. Again, the payment is to be made "directly to the health care 
provider." In the alternative, the parent who owes money can make "arrangements with the 
health care provider for the payment of the percentage allocated to each party." 
There is a hold harmless provision for medical expenses, but there is no indemnification 
prov1s10n. 
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In her affidavit, the Plaintiff alleges that the Defendant has been informed that the 
Plaintiff has incurred certain expenses. She then alleges-by incorporation of her 
correspondence to the Defendant--that Defendant has refused to provide her "reimbursement" for 
medical expenses. The Plaintiff has again ignored the protocol required for processing claims 
for medical expenses. Plaintiff also again fails to provide the Defendant with receipts for all the 
claimed expenses. (Aff of Defendant at 2). 
b. The Affidavits Filed By Ms. Bell In Response To The Motion For Summary 
Judgment Do Not Cure The Deficiencies Of The Original Affidavit. 
The Appellant can find no rule of case which would allow a deficient initiating affidavit 
to be cured by the filing of a supplemental affidavit on contempt. Even if such authority exists, 
however, the additional affidavits do not create a genuine issue of material fact. Those affidavits 
are somewhat evasive in that the assertions are conclusory. The material facts remain 
undisputed. Mr. Eagy was never asked to pay a health care provider directly, was never 
provided a bill and explanation of benefits, and never contracted to pay Ms. Bell's friend to 
provide daycare. The only material fact established by the Affidavit of Jenny Shepherd is that 
Ms. Bell may be guilty of perjury in her initiating affidavit. In Ms. Bell's first affidavit 
(AFFIDAVIT OF BRIT ANIE BELL IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR NONSUMMARY 
FINDIN OF CONTEMPT) she asserts that she has paid all the daycare for the children. In 
emails attached to her affidavit, Ms. Bell claims to have paid over $2,000.00. In the body of her 
affidavit, she claims $2,084.00 has been incurred for daycare. 
In the AFFIDAVIT OF JENNY SHEPHERD, we see that Ms. Bell has only paid one-half 
of the amount claimed. The party who is owed the alleged debt is Ms. Shepherd, the friend of 
Ms. Bell and the wife of the attorney pursuing the claim. 
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III. CONCLUSION 
Judge Day saw this case for what is was. We have a decree which requires both parties 
to have relationship with a daycare provider. If one of the parties then breaches that agreement, 
the other can enforce payment by contempt. The decree is unusual, but it was intended to avoid 
the sort of circumstance now facing Mr. Eagy. A friend of Ms. Bell's claiming she is owed 
money by Mr. Eagy even though he never contracted with her. Ms. Bell demands 
reimbursement by falsely claiming she paid the expense. When Mr. Eagy refuses the demand, 
Ms. Shepherd has her husband file contempt against Mr. Eagy. Judge Day was correct in his 
interpretation of the decree and his analysis of the pleadings on this contempt action, and his 
decision should be affirmed. 
DATED this I 5~ day of_-_J_v_n._,;;, ___ , 2014. 
MILLER & HARR 
Attorneys for the Defendant/ Appellant 
By: 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the~ day of J\.11-l- , 2014, I caused to be 
served a true and correct copy of the foregoing document by the method and address indicated 
below to the following: 
Ron R. Shepherd 
R. SHEPHERD LAW, PLLC 
850 E. Franklin Rd. Ste. 404 
Meridian, ID 83642 
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